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Empirical Insights from Zhejiang Province, China
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ABSTRACT
On paper the state-run lawyer disciplinary system in China serves multiple
interests: client protection, maintaining the reputation of the legal profession,
upholding the rule of law, and safeguarding the party-state authority. This Article
assesses which of these interests dominates in the lawyer disciplinary process by
analyzing 122 published lawyer discipline cases from Zhejiang Province from
2007-2015. These records of lawyer discipline evidence an authoritarian
political logic of attorney discipline, with punishment most clearly serving to
safeguard the Communist Party's rule by keeping lawyers in bounds and tightly
tied to their law firms. Subordinate to this are other state interests such as
upholding the legal system and rule of law, as well as private interests of
protecting firm income. Client protection is a secondary interest at best, with only
a handful of cases having clear client-protection goals. The dominance of
party-state interests reflects not only the socialist legacy, but also the persistence
of an authoritarian legality in contemporary China.
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INTRODUCTION
Attorneys in Taizhou, a city in China's Zhejiang Province, showered Judge
Wang Jianhong of the Taizhou Intermediate People's Court with appreciation for
his assistance. Xu Yucong paid 15,000 yuan (ca. $2,300) to Judge Wang. Mou
Xuijn took the judge out to a meal and gave him 10,000 yuan (ca. $1,540). Guo
Rui treated Judge Wang to dinner and gave him 1,000 yuan (ca. $154) in the
hopes of getting the judge of his choice assigned to a case. Li Hongfei slipped
him 1,000 yuan and two shopping cards worth a total of 1,500 yuan (ca. $230) at
the entrance to the court. Judge Wang was criminally convicted for this conduct,
sentenced to six years in prison, fined, and ordered to disgorge the illegal gain.1
What of the lawyers? Three would be suspended for three to nine months; one
was criminally convicted, sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison, and had
1. Zhejiang Taizhou City People's Court Criminal Decisions: Case No. 215 of the Public Prosecution of
Jiaojiang District (June 16, 2008), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blogc42ed6lfOlOlez2u.html [https://perma.cc/
CZJ7-9TQE] (translation on file with authors).
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his license revoked; another seven did not receive public discipline.2
When attorney Li Zhongliang charged his client one million yuan for a
representation, he only turned over 300,000 yuan (i.e., thirty percent) to his law
firm.3 He repeated this pattern again with even larger sums of money. Whatever
repercussions from the firm, attorney Li would be suspended from practice for six
months. Lawyers who disclosed a client's private matters, faked a client's
signature, fabricated evidence, delivered a letter for a suspect when interviewing
him at a detention center, had more than the authorized number of children-all
found themselves subject to attorney discipline in Zhejiang Province.
These are striking examples of China's system of attorney regulation. They
showcase a system of lawyer regulation that is legislated and enforced by
Chinese state institutions and state-led bar associations. They highlight how
Chinese lawyers are no longer simple servants of the state, but more akin to
attorneys in the West serving multiple and often conflicting interests of
advocating for their client, earning income for their firm and themselves, while
working within the confines of the law. Chinese lawyers, however, are different
from their American colleagues in that they practice in an authoritarian system.4
This produces a lawyer regulation system in China that is designed not only to
protect clients, the legal system, and the reputation of the legal profession, but
also to control lawyers so that they will not oppose or undermine the party-state
authority. Thus, the Chinese government maintains tight control over the
licensing and regulation of lawyers and has implemented a panoply of formal and
informal techniques to monitor and restrain attorneys.5 This has allowed the
2. We tracked the consequences to the lawyers by examining the reported public discipline of attorneys in
Zhejiang Province, see Zhejiang Province Lawyer Integrated Management Platform, http://220.191.244.19/
zjlawyermanager/view/supervisionComplaints/HonestPublic/execute/honestPublicList.do [https://perma.cc/
QYB9-D2Q3] (translation on file with authors) (including data current through June 2015) (last visited Mar. 11,
2017) [hereinafter Zhejiang Province Database]. For additional explanation of methodology, see infra note 10.
3. See Li Zhongliang (Hangzhou Mun. Bureau of Justice, June 15, 2015) (Case No. 2015100023), in
Zhejiang Province Database, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6, 6-7, 13, 16 (2003); Fu Hualing
& Richard Cullen, Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an Authoritarian State: Toward Critical
Lawyering, 59 CHINA J. 111 (2008); Sida Liu, Lawyers, State Officials, and Significant Others: Symbiotic
Exchange in the Chinese Legal Services Market, 206 CHINA Q. 276 (2011) [hereinafter Liu, Lawyers, State
Officials, and Significant Others]; Michael A. Witt & Gordon Redding, China: Authoritarian Capitalism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 11-32 (Michael A. Witt & Gordon Redding eds., 2011);
Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion, in ASIAN
DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAw 1 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=445821 [https://perma.cc/8Q8P-RTVG]. Authoritarian political logic is a complex dynamic. See also Mary
E. Gallagher, AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY: LAw, WORKERS AND THE STATE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (submitted to
Cambridge U. Press; Academia.edu) (on file with Sida Liu).
5. See, e.g., Benjamin van Rooij, Weak Enforcement, Strong Deterrence: Dialogues with Chinese Lawyers
About Tax Evasion and Compliance, 41 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 288 (2016) [hereinafter van Rooij, Weak
Enforcement, Strong Deterrence]; Elizabeth M. Lynch, China's Rule of Law Mirage: The Regression of the
Legal Profession Since the Adoption of the 2007 Lawyers Law, 42 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 535 (2010)
[hereinafter Lynch, Rule ofLaw Mirage].
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Chinese government to grow a legally trained cohort of professionals while
trying to constrain, with mixed success, lawyer activism that might be seen as a
threat to the Communist regime.
The governmental control over lawyers in China has received significant
attention abroad, with a dominant focus on political control and repression of
lawyers, particularly through detention, torture, and criminal prosecution.6 There
has been far less scholarly attention to discipline as in the cases discussed above.
As such, we know far less about the actual operation of China's lawyer regulation
through disciplinary rules and systems administered by bar associations and
justice bureaus. The disciplinary system, as we outline below, does at least on
paper serve multiple interests: safeguarding the party-state authority, protecting
the rule of law, upholding the reputation of the legal profession, and protecting
clients, a goal that has mostly been ignored in existing studies of lawyer
regulation in China." By studying the practice of the state-led disciplinary
system, we develop a more fine-grained picture of how the party-state prioritizes
different interests in the regulation of lawyers. 9
To explore how the party-state prioritizes the interests of the state, clients, the
legal system, as well as the legal profession, we examine the Provincial Bureau of
Justice's disciplinary actions brought against attorneys in Zhejiang Province in
China. Zhejiang Province puts short case summaries of lawyer disciplinary
actions online and has publicly reported 122 disciplinary cases over a nine-year
period from 2007 to 2015.1o These cases provide a fascinating snapshot of the
6. See, e.g., Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, Political Liberalism and Political Embeddedness: Understand-
ing Politics in the Work of Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers, 45 LAW & SocY REV. 831 (2011) [hereinafter
Liu & Halliday, Political Liberalism]; EVA PiUs, CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE
(2015); SIDA Liu & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK
(2016) [hereinafter Liu & HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA].
7. Roderick O'Brien has helpfully ventured into the void by studying discipline by the Lawyers
Associations. See Roderick O'Brien, Discipline for China's Lawyers: Records from Shenzhen, 44 H.K. L.J. 339
(2014) [hereinafter O'Brien, Records from Shenzhen]; Roderick O'Brien, Discipline for China's Lawyers:
Records from Beijing, 43 H.K. L.J. 377 (2013).
8. See Richard W.S. Wu & Kay-Wah Chan, Regulatory Regimes for Lawyers'Ethics in Japan and China: A
Comparative Study, 5 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 49, 57 (2012) [hereinafter Wu & Chan, Regulatory Regimes]
("[T]he Chinese regulatory framework incorporates the virtue of 'competence'" although it is less comprehen-
sive than Japan's framework and "needs to improve its regulatory framework in the 'competence' virtue").
9. Western observers understandably tend to focus on the political issues in China, which can create blind
spots in our analysis. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double
Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 72 (2005).
10. Methodology: From 2010 to June 15, 2015, several bilingual research assistants translated the posted
disciplinary actions. We created a spreadsheet in which we placed the Chinese and English translations together
to allow the bilingual co-authors to check for consistency in interpretation. We used data available as of June 15,
2015. It appears that the Zhejiang website has been expanded and reorganized since our translation. A copy of
the data used in this analysis is on file with the authors. In this analysis we focus on the discipline of individual
attorneys, rather than law firm discipline, to allow us to better compare the Zhejiang information with U.S.
regulatory data on attorney discipline. We very much appreciate the constraints of comparison in this context.
But, as they say, the best is the enemy of the good. The online summaries appear at the Zhejiang Province
Database, supra note 2.
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goals of the Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Justice during this period.
Based on the data analysis presented below, we conclude that the ZPBOJ's
formal attorney discipline system does not have a strong client-protection goal
and puts some attention on protecting the rule of law and the reputation of
lawyers. The dominant attention is on an interesting range of state interests, with
a heavy focus on reinforcing the infrastructure of political and regulatory control
over lawyers and the legal profession. The most common basis of discipline
involved what were characterized as "fee" or "unauthorized practice of law"
issues, almost all of which involved lawyers who charged or represented clients
without permission of their law firm. Making this conduct a dominant focus of
regulation promotes the state interest of placing the law firm as an important
center of lawyer control. Some disciplinary actions that might be seen as
protecting the legal system as a whole, such as sanctions on fabrication of
evidence and suborning perjury, have been used to punish zeal in criminal
defense representation, such as when lawyers challenge the legitimacy of a
confession that was given under duress or torture. 1 State power has also been
used to promote other social goals, as in the case of a lawyer who lost his license
for three months for having more children than were authorized at the time. Only
a handful of the 122 cases involved failure to perform the lawyer's duty as legal
counsel, which in the United States, we would equate with neglect or classic
wrongdoing, such as stealing from the client or undertaking a representation that
involved a conflict of interest. Given that lawyer competence, manifested often
through neglect, is the most common basis of client complaints in many
countries, an interesting question is why institutional resources at the ZPBOJ,
and possibly other justice bureaus in China, do not pursue this as a regulatory
priority. 12
Part I of the Article explores the development of the legal profession in China.
Part II examines the regulatory objectives that can be discerned from both the
Lawyers Law and the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the All China
Lawyers Association (ACLA). With that foundation, in Part III we examine the
disciplinary cases in the Zhejiang Province and analyze the emerging patterns.
The Concluding Analysis provides additional analysis and discussion about the
larger implications of these findings.
11. Liu & HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA, supra note 6, at 57-60.
12. The All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) has publicly stated that in recent years there have been
concerns about lawyers "not respecting professional ethics, a lack of concern for integrity, and not following the
law to perform duties, or not fully performing duties in practice and conduct harmful to clients' or parties' rights
and interests has sometimes occurred." ACLA Explanation of Reforms to the Lawyers Code of Conduct, CHINA
LAW TRANSLATE (June 22, 2014), http://chinalawtranslate.com/acla-explanation-of-reforms-to-the-lawyers-code-
of-conduct/llang=en [https://perma.cc/C8S7-Q4FP] (unofficial translation) [hereinafter ACLA Explanation of
Code Reforms]. We appreciate that historically lawyer discipline systems around the world have also not
prioritized client protection, although there is evidence that is changing. See infra note 76 and accompanying
text.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN CHINA
A. THE LEGAL PROFESSION-FROM STATE TO PRIVATE
The legal profession in contemporary China was rebuilt on the ruins of the
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The profession was formally revived in 1980
with the promulgation of the Interim Regulation on Lawyers, which defined
lawyers as "legal workers of the state" rather than fiduciaries of the client or
officers of the court. 13 Until the late 1980s, all Chinese lawyers were state
employees working in legal advisory divisions (fali guwenchu) or state-owned
law firms, often with similar administrative ranks as other state bureaucrats.
Criminal defense and ordinary civil litigation constituted the majority of their
work. 14
From 1988 to 2001, Chinese lawyers experienced a rapid process of
privatization. After experimenting for a few years with a transitional organiza-
tional form, "cooperative law firms" (hezuo suo), China began to permit
partnership law firms in the early 1990s. These partnership firms were legiti-
mized by the 1997 Lawyers Law of the People's Republic of China (Lawyers
Law). 15 After a state-led "unhooking and restructuring" (tuogou gaizhi) cam-
paign in 2000-2001, the majority of Chinese law firms were restructured from
state-owned firms into partnerships. 16 The total number of lawyers in China also
increased from 31,410 in 1988 to 117,260 by 2000.17 After China's accession to
the World Trade Organization in 2001, corporate legal services serving both
foreign and Chinese enterprises expanded rapidly. By the mid-2010s, a number of
Chinese corporate law firms had grown into mega-firms with thousands of
lawyers and extensive international networks." The majority of Chinese lawyers,
however, still work in smaller law firms with an "eat what you kill" system of
commission-fee-based compensation.19
13. Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Lawyers (promulgated by Standing Comm.
Nat'i People's Cong., Aug. 26, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1982) art. 1, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=
785&lib=law [https://perma.cclC5GD-HRU5].
14. Liu, Lawyers, State Officials, and Significant Others, supra note 4, at 282.
15. Law on Lawyers (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective
June 1, 2008), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471604.htm [https://perma.cc/
38J7-4C59] (unofficial translation) [hereinafter Lawyers Law].
16. Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China's Transition
from Socialism, 113 AM. J. Soc. 352, 353, 370-73 (2007) [hereinafter Michelson, Political Embeddedness].
17. Sida Liu, The Changing Roles of Lawyers in China: State Bureaucrats, Market Brokers, and Political
Activists, in THE NEw LEGAL REALISM: STUDYING LAw GLOBALLY 180 (Heinz Klug & Sally Engle Merry eds.,
2016).
18. Sida Liu & Hongqi Wu, The Ecology of Organizational Growth: Chinese Law Firms in the Age of
Globalization, 122 AM. J. Soc. 798, 799 (2016) [hereinafter Liu & Wu, Ecology of Organizational Growth].
19. Michelson, Political Embeddedness, supra note 16, at 374. "Eat what you kill" is a colloquial phrase that
indicates a lawyer is paid based on the revenue the lawyer brings into the firm, minus some percent retained by
the firm to cover the lawyer's overhead.
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By March 2016, there were approximately 297,000 lawyers in more than
24,000 law firms across China.2 0 Like the legal profession in the United States
and many other countries, the geographic distribution of Chinese lawyers is
highly unequal and the majority of them are concentrated in major cities on the
east coast and other provincial capitals.2 1 While Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangdong Province have the highest numbers of lawyers, Zhejiang Province,
the site of our study, also has a large and rapidly growing lawyer population. The
total number of Zhejiang lawyers increased from 9,289 in 2010 to 14,144 in
2014, and they handled 1.05 million cases in 2014, with total billings of 16.08
billion yuan (ca. $2.46 billion).2 2
B. THE WEB OF REGULATION AND THE ROLE OF FORMAL
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
Lawyers in China are subject to regulation by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ),
supplemented by the All China Lawyers Association (ACLA), the state-led
national bar association. This dual-regulatory structure, with authority to regulate
given to both the Bureau of Justice (BOJ) and Lawyers Association at the
provincial, municipal, and county levels, can result in regulatory complexities.2 3
There is a BOJ at every administrative level of the government (i.e., the
provincial, municipal, and district/county levels) and the Lawyers Association,
though formally a professional association, is a "minor player" compared to the
Ministry of Justice.t The BOJ maintains control over licensing and disciplinary
sanctions, but it delegates to the Lawyers Association the obligation to collect
membership fees and assess fitness through annual review. 25 The Lawyers
Associations also have the ability to engage in attorney discipline.2 6
The government, through the BOJ, puts particular attention on the Lawyers
Law and supplemental regulation.27 The Lawyers Law, promulgated by the
20. See ALL CHINA LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.acla.org.cn/hybgzdt/24911.jhtml [https://perma.cc/
7FXU-G2ER] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) [hereinafter ACLAWEBSITE] (official website).
21. See Sida Liu, Lily Liang, & Ethan Michelson, Migration and Social Structure: The Spatial Mobility of
Chinese Lawyers, 36 LAw & PoL'Y 165, 171-75 (2014).
22. Shi Yuxiang, 'l5l~fgl i 52.3% 103 AB N EVAI5i [The Number of Lawyers in
Zhejiang Province Increased by 52.3% in Four Years; 103 Are Penalized for Violations], ZHEJIANG ONLINE
(June 13, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/system/2015/06/13/020696474.shtml [https://perma.cc/6B
WR-6HH7] [hereinafter Yuxiang, Lawyers in Zhejiang Province].
23. See Liu & HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA, supra note 6, at 68-7 1.
24. O'Brien, Records from Shenzhen, supra note 7, at 339.
25. Lawyers Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective June
1, 2008) art. 4, 6, 9, 46, 47-52, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471604.htm
[https://perma.cc/38J7-4C59] (unofficial translation).
26. See supra note 7.
27. See, e.g., Measures for Punishing Outraging Lawyers and Law Firms for their Illegal Acts (promulgated
by the Ministry of Justice, Apr. 7, 2010, effective June 1, 2010) (Law Info China); Administrative Measures for
the Practice of Law by Lawyers (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, July 18, 2008, effective Nov. 1, 2016)
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National People's Congress, expressly gives authority to the BOJ of the province,
autonomous region, or municipality to impose discipline ranging from warnings
to suspensions of practice for up to one year and confiscation of illegal proceeds,
for a number of listed activities.28 The MOJ, the ACLA, and the BOJs can
promulgate additional regulations on lawyer discipline, but only within the scope
of the Lawyers Law. It is presumably under these provisions in the Lawyers Law
that the Zhejiang Provincial Bureau of Justice disciplines lawyers.2 9
The ACLA has adopted a separate Lawyers Practice Code of Conduct (Code of
Conduct), a document drafted on the basis of the Lawyers Law for the purpose of
"standardizing lawyers' practice and safeguarding lawyers' practice rights and
interests." 3 0 Lawyers are required to be members of the provincial and municipal
Lawyers Associations, which are local branches of the ACLA.3 1 Under the
Lawyers Law, the Lawyers Associations are charged with assuring lawyers
practice in accordance with the law and with protecting lawyers' lawful rights
and interests.3 2 The Lawyers Associations are also charged with inspection of the
professional ethics and practice disciplines of lawyers.3 3
II. REGULATORY OBJECTIVES
Our analysis of both the Lawyers Law and ACLA Code of Conduct indicates
that, at least on paper, there are four broad goals in regulating lawyers in China:
protecting client interests; building up and protecting the professional reputation
of lawyers; upholding the rule of law and the respect for China's nascent legal
institutions; and assuring that lawyers act as socialist legal workers in serving the
interests of the party-state and in not undermining the authority of the party.34
(Law Info China); Measures for the Administration of Lawyers' Service Charges (promulgated by the Nat'i
Dev. & Reform Comm'n, Ministry of Justice, Apr. 13, 2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006) (Westlaw China); Certain
Provisions of the Ministry of Justice on Anti-Unfair Competition Among Lawyers (promulgated by the Ministry
of Justice, Feb. 20, 1995, effective Feb. 20, 1995) (Westlaw China).
28. Lawyers Law, art. 47-50.
29. Article 48 of the Lawyers Law contains stated bases of discipline. Lawyers Law, art. 48. The bases
largely track the provisions of the Lawyers Law, but include one additional strong client protection provision:
"(5) ... failing to appear in court on schedule to participate in litigation or arbitration without justifiable
reasons[.]"
30. Lawyers Practice Code of Conduct (promulgated by the All China Lawyers Ass'n, Nov. 9, 2011,
effective Nov. 9, 2011) art. 1 (Westlaw China) [hereinafter ACLA Code of Conduct]. The Code of Conduct was
adopted in 2004 and amended in 2009 and 2011. Additional amendments are currently pending.
31. Lawyers Law, art. 45.
32. Id. art. 46(1).
33. Id. art. 46(4).
34. This summary does not include any detailed analysis of the regulations that supplement the Lawyers Law
and Code of Conduct.
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A. PROTECTING CLIENT INTERESTS
Client protection interests are woven into the Lawyers Law, supplemental
regulations, and the ACLA Code of Conduct. Both the Lawyers Law and Code of
Conduct try to set a floor of competence by requiring that all lawyers pass a
uniform national judicial exam, engage in practice training in a law firm for a full
year, and be persons of good character and conduct.3 5 The Lawyers Law also
contains a general provision that "[a] lawyer acting as an agent in litigation or
non-litigation legal affairs shall, within the limits of entrustment, protect the
lawful rights and interests of the entrusting party." 3 6 This provision can be
characterized as a fundamental obligation of competence and arguably imposes a
duty of zeal.3 7 Its language, however, is rather broad and it does not make clear
exactly what the lawyer is to do to protect the party's interests. The Code of
Conduct further details the obligations of competence and zeal by requiring
lawyers to "be honest, faithful, diligent and duteous, and safeguard the legitimate
rights and interests of the parties involved . ...
The Lawyers Law also protects clients by generally requiring confidentiality
and prohibiting conflicts of interest. Article 38 provides: "A lawyer shall keep
confidential the secrets of the State and commercial secrets that he comes to
know during his legal practice and shall not divulge the private affairs of the
parties concerned." It continues on to require:
[a] lawyer [to] keep confidential the things and information that he comes to
know during his legal practice which his client or another person does not want
other people to know, with the exception of the facts and information about a
crime which his client or another person prepares to commit or is committing to
endanger State or public security or seriously endanger another person's
personal safety or safety of property.39
35. Lawyers Law, art. 5; see also ACLA Code of Conduct, art. 6.
36. Lawyers Law, art. 30.
37. Professors Richard W.S. Wu and Kay-Wah Chan engaged in a comparative analysis of Japan and China,
concluding that the Chinese regime is less comprehensive than Japan in the area of competence and that "China
needs to improve its regulatory framework in the 'competence' virtue." See Wu & Chan, Regulatory Regimes,
supra note 8, at 57.
38. ACLA Code of Conduct, art. 6.
39. Lawyers Law, art. 38. The ACLA Code of Conduct contains a similar provision at article 8. Pending
proposed revisions to the Code of Conduct include a provision to strengthen the duty of confidentiality. See
ACLA Explanation of Code Reforms, supra note 12 (proposed revision that "lawyers shall protect clients' or
parties' confidential or private information acquired in practice, and must not reveal or disseminate clients' or
parties' commercial secrets, private personal information or other circumstances or information they do not
wish disclosed, either during the case or after it is concluded, without having gotten authorization or consent of
the client or party").
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Endangering state or public security is a potentially very broad exception to the
duty of confidentiality. 40 Further, the attorney-client privilege is not recognized in
China, leaving the lawyer unprotected by either rules of evidence or ethics rules if
a court orders a lawyer to testify.4 1
The Lawyers Law also presents a basic rule against conflicts: "A lawyer shall
not act as agent for both parties involved in one and the same case,"4 2 and a
lawyer is prohibited from "accepting money, things of value or other benefits
offered by the other party and infringing the rights and interests of the client
through ill-intentioned collusion with the other party or a third party." 4 3 Together
these provisions prohibit two egregious forms of a conflict of interest, but frame
them as specific rules and not as part of a larger principle that lawyers should
avoid conflicts of interest. The rules focus on direct adversity and not conflicts
where representing one client may have a significant risk of negatively affecting
the representation of another.4 4 Nor do the rules address conflicts arising out of
former representation or conflicts that are imputed to the firm, with the exception
of direct conflicts.4 5 This thinly developed conflict regulation has allowed law
firms in China to merge and grow quickly through collaborations with less
concern about the effects of conflict rules.4 6
The ACLA Code of Conduct provides guidance on a number of issues that
serve to identify client rights and interests in a representation. 4 7 Articles 34-42 of
the ACLA Code of Conduct focus on the client-agent relationship. They set out
provisions that promote communication between the lawyer and client, establish
obligations to follow through on the representation agreement, and impose duties
to maintain records. Lawyers and the law firm are "entitled to select plans for
accomplishing" the client's purpose "in accordance with laws, principles of
40. While the Lawyers Law does not define these terms, "trade secrets" is defined in other law. XU Xi, A
Comparative Study of Lawyers' Ethics in the US and PRC: Attorney-Client Privilege and Duty of
Confidentiality, 1 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 46, 53 (2009).
41. See id. at 56 ("[A] PRC lawyer, being a PRC citizen, is legally obligated to cooperate with PRC courts,
procuratorates, and public security organs to provide truthful testimony about his client, regardless of whether
the relevant facts and information were originally obtained from the client and requested to be kept
confidential.").
42. Lawyers Law, art. 39.
43. Id. art. 40(3).
44. See ACLA Code of Conduct, art. 50-5 1; Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2016) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES].
45. Cf. MODEL RULES R. 1.9, 1.10.
46. See Liu & Wu, Ecology of Organizational Growth, supra note 18, at 821; Cf. Douglas R. Richmond &
Matthew K. Corbin, Professional Responsibility and Liability Aspects of Vereins, the Swiss Army Knife of
Global Law Firm Combinations, 88 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 917, 931-37 (2014).
47. Draft revisions to the ACLA Code of Conduct provide more detailed guidance on conflicts. See Lawyers
Practice Code of Conduct (Draft Revisions), CHINA LAW TRANSLATE, art. 54 (prevents conflict between lawyer
and client), art. 55 (more precise explanation of simultaneous conflicts) (June 18, 2014), http://chinalawtranslate.
com/lawyers-practice-code-of-conduct-draft-revisions/?lang= en [https://perma.cc/W693-VKGJ].
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fairness and justice and eth[]ical standards for law practice."4 8 This reinforces a
system in which lawyer-client authority rests more with the lawyer than with the
client, bringing the decision-making under the control of the law firm, which in
turn is subject to strong control by the local BOJ. This is different from the rules
in the United States, which promote a more client-centered vision.4 9 A lawyer's
ability to determine how to pursue a legal matter creates a danger that the lawyer
will proceed in a manner that is against the client's wishes, even when the course
the lawyer chooses falls within the overall goals of the representation. One can
think for instance of a divorce case where the wife's lawyer pursues a strongly
confrontational strategy to safeguard her share of the marital assets, even though
she wants to maintain a good relationship with her ex-husband. The goal of the
representation may have been to safeguard her assets, yet doing so by sacrificing
her relationship with her ex-husband goes against her wishes.
In sum, Chinese lawyer regulation does stipulate rules on client protection, yet
these rules are generally less detailed and robust than those in the United States.
Clients in China are less protected when communicating with their lawyers, when
their lawyers are involved in conflicts of interest, or when their lawyers or law
firms dominate how goals are realized even against clients' own wishes.
B. UPHOLDING THE PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND THE RULE OF LAW
The Lawyers Law and the ACLA Code of Conduct contain many rules that
may serve to protect the legal profession as well as the legal system. In part, this
is done by making sure that lawyers honor the profession and the legal system.
The Lawyers Law states that one may not receive a lawyers' practice license if he
has "no . . . or . .. limited capacity for civil conduct," has a criminal record
(except for the crime of negligence), has been discharged from public employ-
ment, or has had his lawyers' practice certificate revoked.o
Another example of a rule that protects the legal profession is the prohibition
against unfair competition: "Law firms and lawyers shall not solicit business by
slandering other law firms or lawyers or paying middleman's fees . . . ."' This
provision appears to be designed to protect the legal profession itself more so
than clients. If the rule were intended to protect clients, a more general rule
against solicitation would have been appropriate. The existing rule singles out
paying middleman's fees and slander, which hurt other lawyers and the legal
profession more than they do clients. We can also wonder why the existence of
48. ACLA Code of Conduct, art. 36.
49. See MODEL RULES R. 1.2.
50. Lawyers Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective June
1, 2008) art. 7, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471604.htm [https://perma.cc/
38J7-4C59] (unofficial translation).
51. Id. art. 26.
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middlemen would be bad for clients, especially because the geographic
distribution of lawyers in China is highly unequal and many poorer clients may
only be able to contact a lawyer through some other legal service provider who
does not have full lawyer qualifications. A true client protection rule would focus
on solicitation of vulnerable clients through exploitation, coercion, or duress, as
the Model Rules and ethics case law do in the United States.5 2
The Lawyers Law also has several provisions that clearly seek to uphold the
rule of law. It prohibits meeting with judges, prosecutors, or arbitrators privately
outside of the regulations, providing bribes to judges, intentionally providing
false evidence or coercing or persuading others into providing false evidence, and
disrupting or interfering with the normal conduct of litigation or arbitration.53
The Code of Conduct also includes a variety of exhortations to protect "the
reputation of the lawyer industry" 54 and to prohibit actions "violating social
ethics and seriously damaging lawyers' professional images."5 5 In some ways,
the current Code of Conduct harkens back to the earlier ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which reads at Canon 9, "[a] lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of impropriety."5 6 This provision was not included in the
1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct or subsequent revisions,
primarily because it was seen as too imprecise and as protecting public image
over content.5 7 Socio-legal scholars have been highly critical of the U.S. legal
profession's tendency to structure self-regulation for the protection of the
profession itself, rather than for the benefit of clients or society more broadly.5 " In
the context of Chinese regulation of lawyers, this critique may be too strong and
out of context. The ACLA Code of Conduct's emphasis on reputation may flow
from many factors, including the general emphasis on collective interests in
China, the weak prestige of the legal profession in public opinion, and the
pressure the profession is under from the party-state.
In sum, we see that in China several rules seek to protect and uphold both the
reputation of the legal profession as well as the broader rule of law. While these
are conceptually separate goals, it is very hard to fully separate them. Rules
aimed at upholding the reputation of the legal profession, by virtue of doing so,
also help develop the rule of law in China, which rests in part on such reputation.
And rules protecting the rule of law, such as the rules about lawyers meeting
52. See MODEL RULES R. 7.3; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978) (concern that
in-person solicitation makes client more vulnerable to influence).
53. See Lawyers Law, art. 40.
54. ACLA Code of Conduct (promulgated by the All China Lawyers Ass'n, Nov. 9, 2011, effective Nov. 9,
2011) art. 7 (Westlaw China).
55. Id. art. 14(5).
56. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
57. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 321-22 (1986).
58. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
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judges, by their very nature also protect lawyers from behavior that will hurt their
overall profession.
C. PROTECTING THE PARTY-STATE
The protection of the party-state is a very strong goal of lawyer regulation in
China. As an overarching principle, article 3 of the Lawyers Law provides that
"lawyers shall be subject to the supervision of the state, the public and the parties
concerned." 5 9 This clearly shows an approach to the legal profession that does
not value independence from the state. The Chinese Communist Party actively
seeks "to maximize its influence over lawyers by all available means, both direct
and indirect."6 0 This web of rules, regulations, and practice is an example of
authoritarian political logic in which the commitment to the rule of law is used to
improve governance, with legal provisions simultaneously used to assure the
dominance of the party-state.
Some of the articles that seemingly serve client, professional, or rule of law
interests may also serve the party-state by giving significant discretion to state
decision-makers. Consider that the law does not clearly define what constitutes
"good character and conduct"62 or people with "limited capacity for civil acts,"6 3
and thus allows the party-state considerable leeway when it seeks to prevent
people from entering the legal profession.
The Lawyers Law also requires that a lawyer practice in a law firm. The firm
itself is subject to regulation and must have a law firm practice certificate.64
Through a series of policy statements and pressure, about ninety percent of all
law firms in China have a Communist Party cell, further assuring political
oversight. 5 This allows an additional level of control via the law firm, although
less than thirty percent of Chinese lawyers are members of the Communist
Party.6 6 To ensure that lawyers actually practice in their firms and to enable better
59. Lawyers Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'i People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective June
1, 2008) art. 3, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471604.htm [https://perma.cc/38J
7-4C59] (unofficial translation). This provision is subject to slightly different translations. Human Rights Watch
translates this provision as "[iln practicing law, a lawyer must accept the supervision of the state, public and
client." Law on Lawyers of the People's Republic of China, art. 3 (adopted at the 19th Sess. of the Standing
Comm. of the Eighth Nat'l People's Cong., May 15, 1996, rev'd Oct. 28, 2007, effective June 1, 2008, Human
Rights Watch trans.), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/chinaO4O8/16.htm [https://perma.cc/YL3D-TUZ7].
60. Gerry Groot & Roderick O'Brien, The Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work with the Legal
Profession, 42 H.K. L.J. 939, 940 (2012).
61. See Gallagher, supra note 4, at ch. II.
62. Lawyers Law, art. 5.
63. Id. art. 7.
64. Id. art. 14-27.
65. Elizabeth M. Lynch, I Pledge Allegiance to the CCP, CHINA L. & PoL`Y (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://chinalawandpolicy.com/tag/party-cells/ [https://perma.cc/KFA9-V2WR].
66. Ethan Michelson & Sida Liu, What Do Chinese Lawyers Want? Political Values and Legal Practice, in
CHINA'S EMERGING MIDDLE CLASs: BEYOND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 310, 313 (Cheng Li ed., 2010).
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party-state control, the Lawyers Law further provides that fees must be collected
by the law firms and that "law firms and lawyers shall pay tax in accordance with
the law." 6 7 Later provisions reiterate that a lawyer shall not privately accept
authorization, collect fees, or accept money, things of value, or other benefits
offered by a client. 8
To reinforce the party-state control over the legal profession, since 2002 the
national judicial examination-the unified qualification exam for lawyers,
judges, and procurators-has tested political values and promoted "a state-
sanctioned vision of professional identity." 6 9 In 2012, the Ministry of Justice,
reiterating similar provisions from the 1980 Interim Regulation on Lawyers,
implemented a new requirement that all lawyers take an oath of allegiance to the
Communist Party when obtaining their practice certificates:
I volunteer to become a practicing lawyer of the People's Republic of China
and promise to faithfully perform the sacred duties of a socialist-with-Chinese-
characteristics legal worker; to be faithful to the motherland and the people; to
uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system;
to safeguard the dignity of the constitution and the law; to practice on behalf of
the people; to be diligent, professional[1y] honest, and corruption-free; to
protect the legitimate rights and interests of clients, the correct implementation
of the law, and social fairness and justice; and diligently strive for the cause of
socialism with Chinese characteristics!7 0
These provisions make clear that a very strong interest of lawyer regulation is to
assure that lawyers do not undermine the interests of the party-state. Lawyer
conduct is to be limited.1
Lawyers who are members of minor parties are subject to controls through the United Front Work Department.
See Groot & O'Brien, supra note 60.
67. Lawyers Law, art. 25.
68. Id. art. 40.
69. Rachel E. Stern, Political Reliability and the Chinese Bar Exam 3 (2015), http://watson.brown.edulfiles/
watson/imce/RSternPolitical%20ReliabilityBROWN.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V8S-E8DX]. As Stern notes,
this can lead to "preference falsification" where test-takers learn to give the politically approved answer even if
their private preferences differ. Id. at 4.
70. Lynch, supra note 65. Anecdotally, it is not clear whether lawyers are currently being required to take this
oath as a condition to receiving their practice certificate. See XIANFA pmbl. (2004) (China), http://www.npc.gov.
cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372962.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZP2-EDM6].
71. A recent example is the ACLA announcement on June 30, 2014 that the license of Zhejiang human rights
lawyer Wang Cheng had been canceled. Police detained Cheng after he attempted to gather signatures to
encourage the government to join the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Xin
Yu & Wen Yuqing, Chinese Rights Lawyer Vows to Keep Up Pressure On Party, RADIO FREE ASIA (Feb. 18,
2014), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/lawyer-02182014110708.html [https://perma.cc/4EJ2-H9QW].
Cheng stated publicly that the Zhejiang Department of Justice had not investigated and had not informed him of
the cancellation of his license and that he intended to pursue legal measures to hold them responsible.
SIWELUOZI's BLOG (July 1, 2014), http://www.siweiluozi.net/2014/07/acla-issues-formal-notice-distancing.
html [https://perma.cc/3MD2-H3U6].
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Overall, these regulatory goals overlap with goals that we see in lawyer
regulation in other legal systems. Geoffrey Hazard and Angelo Dondi have
identified the common professional virtues as "competence; independence;
loyalty to client; maintaining the confidentiality of client secrets; responsibility to
the courts and to colleagues; and honorable conduct in professional and personal
matters." 7 2 All of these are touched upon in the regulation of lawyers in China,
although independence clearly does not mean independence from the state. The
question is what aspects of the lawyer's conduct get the attention of regulators.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS IN
ZHEJIANG PROVINCE
With these broad regulatory goals in mind (protecting client interests,
upholding the reputation of lawyers, upholding the rule of law, and protecting the
party-state), we can now turn to the disciplinary cases issued at the provincial
level in Zhejiang Province. We do so in order to find out which of the goals
reflected in the rules regulating lawyers are more likely to be pursued and
reported in disciplinary proceedings. The cases reflect the BOJ's administrative
discretion as to which cases to bring to discipline and potentially which to put
into a public database.7 3
For a base of comparison, the most common client complaint in the United
States is neglect, a finding confirmed in multiple studies over decades.74 This
pattern has also been seen in Canada, the United Kingdom, Scotland, Australia,
and Denmark.7 5 In some U.S. jurisdictions, competence, neglect, mishandling of
client funds, and improper fees are also the most common bases of discipline. 6
The ACLA has also identified similar competence and neglect issues among
77Chinese lawyers as a serious concern.
But as the legal profession has developed in recent years, some new situations
and problems have emerged in lawyers' practice such as lawyers not respecting
72. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 109 (2004).
73. As we embark on this analysis, it is important to note that a different body, such as a court, may
potentially discipline a lawyer in the context of litigation. For example, in the United States courts can use their
inherent power to regulate the conduct of attorneys who appear before them. In this context, the U.S. courts tend
to have a narrower regulatory goal of assuring that the lawyer's misconduct does not taint the underlying
proceeding. Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1425 (2004).
74. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM AITORNEY DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS 57 (2008) [hereinafter ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK]; Judith A. McMorrow, In Defense of the
Business of Law, 40 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 459, 462 (2012).
75. See ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK, supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., MASS. OFF. OF THE B. COUNS. OF THE SUPREME JUD. CT., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 16, http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/fy2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H4B-
SGGRI.
77. See ACLA Explanation of Code Reforms, supra note 12.
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professional ethics, a lack of concern for integrity, and not following the law to
perform duties, or not fully performing duties in practice and conduct harmful
to clients' or parties' rights and interests has sometimes occurred. Some lawyers
do not follow confidentiality obligations, casually releasing, disclosing and
disseminating client and party secrets and private information which they have
acquired as a result of the representation, and certain lawyers have even come
to challenge the bottom line of the law, maliciously using litigation rights,
encouraging and aiding the incitement of public opinion, instigating pressure
'78on the case-handling organs.
Given this concern, we were particularly interested to see if the disciplinary
matters brought by the Zhejiang Province would reflect these issues.
A. OVERVIEW OF ZHEJIANG PROVINCE
Zhejiang Province is located along the coast south of Shanghai. With fifty-four
million people, Zhejiang has a larger population than Spain or any single U.S.
state. Zhejiang grew its private economy rapidly in the post-Mao era and is the
home of over one-third of China's 500 largest privately owned enterprises. 7 9 As
of 2014, this economically vibrant province had 1,158 registered law firms and
14,144 lawyers.o About 35.5% of the lawyers are Communist Party members,
although it is unclear whether membership is driven by political affinity or a
desire to obtain the economic benefits that may flow from party membership."' In
compliance with the national initiative to improve party presence in law firms,
254 firms have set up their own party cells, another 413 have set up party cells
with other law firms, and 124 without party cells have a designated party
liaison.8 2 In addition to party control, ZPBOJ and local BOJs, and local bar
associations, also exercise administrative control over law firms and lawyers.
This information suggests that Zhejiang has in place an infrastructure to inspect
and supervise the law firms and lawyers in the province.83
78. Id.
79. Qi Zhang, Communist Revolution as the Origin of the Capitalism in The Red China: The Political
Economy of the Private Economy in Zhejiang Province 2-3 (Aug. 5, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid= 1654167 [https://perma.cc/2KGZ-WJ65].
80. Yuxiang, Lawyers in Zhejiang Province, supra note 22.
81. Lawyers'Work in Zhejiang Province Realizes Healthy Development, CHINAFINDLAw (Jan. 18, 2011), http://
china.findlaw.cn/info/lvshi/lsdt/145029.html [https://perma.cc/FXT3-4533] [hereinafter Healthy Development
in Zhejiang]; see also Hongbin Li, Pak Wai Liu, Junsen Zhang & Ning Ma, Economic Returns to Communist
Party Membership: Evidence from Urban Chinese Twins (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2118, 2006), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=901248 [http://ssrn.com/abstract=901248].
82. Healthy Development in Zhejiang, supra note 81; see also William P. Alford, Of Lawyers Lost and
Found: Searching for Legal Professionalism in the People's Republic of China, in RAISING THE BAR 287, 294
(W. Alford ed., 2007) (where regulations "require that law firms form Communist Party cells and senior
lawyers ... provide junior colleagues with ideological, as well practical, training").
83. Development of ethical infrastructure within U.S. law firms has been a strong theme over the last twenty
years, at least among U.S. legal academics. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77
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B. THE DATA
In accordance with the Lawyers Law, Zhejiang Province has a formal
regulatory structure to discipline attorneys, which is administered through the
ZPBOJ and local BOJs at the municipal level. Using the 122 publicly available
disciplinary cases from January 2007 to June 15, 2015, we probe several
questions.8 4 We begin with the type of misconduct that was the basis of discipline
in each of the proceedings.
Fee - - 37i
Criminal Conviction 2
Unauthorized Practice of Law1
Bribery 10
Forgey 10
Failed to Perform Duty as Legal Counsel 4
Management Responsibility 3
Solicited Clients Through Illegal Means 2




Illegally Helping an Inmate A I
Improper Communication with Judge
Misappropriated Clients Property
Practiced at More than One Law Firm
Violated Birth Control Policy 1
Violated Regulation ofConflicts of Interest I
0 10 20 30 40
FIGURE I: Type of Misconduct
As Figure I indicates, almost eighty-five percent of the disciplinary matters fell
into five categories: fees, criminal convictions, unauthorized practice of law,
forgery, and bribery. 5 These categories will be discussed in detail below.
As noted above, with the exception of a criminal conviction, which requires
revocation of the lawyer's license, the penalties fell on a spectrum that is familiar
to observers of U.S. attorney regulation: warnings, fines, and suspensions of 3-12
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 10 (1991); Susan Saab Fortney, Systematically Thinking About Law Firm Ethics:
Conference on the Ethical Infrastructure and Culture of Law Firms, 42 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 5 (2013); Debra
Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of Process and Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL
PROF. 209, 211 (2011). Both Australia and the UK have moved to management-based regulation at the firm
level. The China experience reminds us that building an infrastructure of control at the firm level puts all of the
ambiguity on what we mean by "ethical."
84. See supra notes 2, 10.
85. The database provides little demographic information beyond gender. Although women accounted for
over twenty-eight percent of Zhejiang lawyers in 2013, only seven of the 122 disciplined lawyers in our
database were female. See ACLA WEBSITE, supra note 20. The violations by female attorneys broke down into
one criminal conviction (illegal pooling of savings deposits); three cases involving fees (charging clients
without permission); one case including an additional charge of charging a contingency fee for marriage or
succession cases; and one instance of forgery (intentionally providing falsified evidence).
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months. With a system of annual renewal of licenses, the disciplinary apparatus
does not need to go through a disciplinary proceeding to get rid of troublesome
lawyers. Requiring that lawyers have both good character and fitness,"6 and
requiring exclusion for lawyers having no or limited capacity for "civil
conduct,"8 provides significant flexibility to decline annual renewals of practice
certificates. This provides a powerful tool when authorities want to curtail
lawyers they deem subversive or who challenge state or powerful interests. The
large discretion in deciding whether to renew lawyers' practice certificates thus
allows for much state-oriented regulation outside of the actual disciplinary
system. And this in turn may explain why revocation of licenses is not used as a
sanction for disciplinary matters other than criminal convictions.
As Figure II below shows, suspensions in the 3-6 month range were the most
common penalty. Of the four cases involving failure "to perform duty as legal
counsel" (i.e., three percent of the disciplinary cases), which we interpret as a
form of neglect, three of those matters involved warnings or warnings with a fine;
only one resulted in a suspension for five months. Outside of criminal conduct,
what emerges is broadly speaking a disciplinary system that is quite lenient and









FIGURE II: Discipline and Punishment Imposed
The number of disciplinary cases is sufficiently small that it is difficult to draw
an inference about trends in bringing disciplinary actions. The disciplinary cases
in our database involved fairly small numbers, ranging between 9-22 cases per
year from 2008 to 2014. After the close of our translation, it appears that the
86. Lawyers Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective June
1, 2008) art. 5(4), http://www.npc.gov.cnlenglishnpclLaw/2009-02/20/content_1471604.htm [https://perma.cc/
38J7-4C59] (unofficial translation).
87. Id. art 7(1).
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ZPBOJ has increased its public posting of discipline."" This may coincide with
the ACLA's 2014 pronouncement that there is an urgent need to resolve "the
problems that the public and society have vigorously expressed regarding
lawyers," including a need to strengthen "the establishment of lawyers'
professional ethics."89 It may also reflect the heightened political control over the
legal profession by the party-state in response to the rising lawyer activism in
recent years. 90
There also appears to be a trend toward local municipalities disciplining (or at
least having their disciplinary actions posted). For the first four-and-a-half years,
all the disciplinary cases were issued by the ZPBOJ, which is located in
Hangzhou-the capital of Zhejiang Province and its largest city. Starting in July
2011, more cases were issued by the municipal BOJs outside of the provincial
capital, such as those in Jinhua, Taizhou, Wenzhou, Ningbo, Shaoxing, and
Zhoushan.91 In 2014, over sixty percent of the cases (fourteen out of twenty-two)
were issued at the local municipal level.
It is difficult to discern, beyond speculation, why there has been a move toward
more local imposition of lawyer discipline. One possibility is the increasingly
heavy workload for the ZPBOJ as the number of lawyers in Zhejiang rises over
time-delegating more work to the local BOJs would free the ZPBOJ from many
routine regulatory tasks. Without access to the ZPBOJ's internal rules, however,
it is impossible for us to investigate the specific regulatory jurisdictions between
the ZPBOJ and the local BOJs. Another possibility is the concern for maintaining
social stability at the local level. While concepts of subsidiarity usually applaud
the movement of power to the level closest to the people, in China this is a more
complex policy.92 Local officials, who are evaluated based heavily on their
ability to maintain social control and promote economic development, have a
strong incentive to control attorneys who may challenge their authority. The
central party, however, recognizes that abuse of local authority (e.g., corruption)
is also a threat to social stability. Putting dominant authority on local officials to
regulate attorneys has an element of the fox guarding the chicken coop.
88. As a reminder, our database includes cases posted on the Zhejiang website as of June 15, 2015. See supra
notes 2, 10.
89. ACIA Explanation of Code Reforms, supra note 12.
90. See Pius, supra note 6; Liu & HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA, supra note 6.
91. Zhejiang Province Database, supra note 2. Hangzhou is the capital and largest city in Zhejiang Province,
with a registered population of 8.84 million. Hangzhou (Zhejiang) City Information, CHINA KNOWLEDGE
ONLINE, http://www.chinaknowledge.com/Citylnfo/City.aspx?Region=Coastal&City=Hangzhou [https://perma.
cc/Z5KC-UPQN] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). Other cities issuing disciplinary reports are Jinhua (4.69 million),
Ningbo (5.57 million), Shaozxing (4.34 million), Taizhou (5.5 million), and Zhoushan (965,800).
92. For an interesting analysis of the complexity of subsidiarity in the context of the European Union, see
Paul Craig, Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis, 50 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 72 (2012).
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C. DISCIPLINING DIFFERENT INTERESTS
Publicly revealing lawyer disciplinary matters sends a signal to both lawyers
and the general public about the regulatory priorities of the ZPBOJ. This data
indicates that the ZPBOJ is concerned heavily with keeping lawyers tightly
bound to their law firms, followed by excluding lawyers who have been
criminally convicted (although questions remain about the possibility of criminal
convictions as a way to control lawyers who have become too independent) and
discouraging bribery. Other concerns are more episodic.
1. LAW FIRM FEE VIOLATIONS-CLIENT PROTECTION OR STATE INTEREST?
Fee violations overwhelmingly represent the most common basis of discipline
in Zhejiang-thirty-seven cases, 30.3% of the disciplinary cases in our database.
Another eighteen cases were categorized as "unauthorized practice," but fourteen
of the eighteen cases involved the similar conduct described in fee violations,
typically "representing a client without permission" of the firm. This brings the
total law firm fee violation cases to fifty-one cases, over forty percent of all the
disciplinary matters reported in Zhejiang Province. Obviously, this activity is a
common and persistent concern of the regulators.
The law firm fee violations fell into the following patterns:
* Charging clients without the permission of the law firm: twenty-one cases
* Representing and charging clients without the permission of the law firm:
ten cases
* Representing without permission and another offense, such as also setting
up own office, falsifying documents, charging contingency fees for
marriage or succession cases, or failing to turn over money: five cases
The unauthorized practice of law violations fell into the following pattern:
* Representing clients without the permission of the law firm: ten cases
* Representing clients without the permission of the law firm and an
additional offense, such as working in two firms simultaneously, sealing
an official letter, or not having a written contract: four cases
In the United States, fee issues would typically be characterized as client
protection issues because most attorney discipline over fees involves a question
of either excessive fees or failure to perform the promised services.9 3 The
concern in the Zhejiang fee violation cases, however, is not the fact of charging
an excessive fee, but doing so outside of the oversight of the law firm. This could
occur in any number of ways. The lawyer might never report the client to the firm
and take all of the fees directly. The lawyer might retain the client through the
93. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 57, § 9.3.
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firm, but only report part of the income while taking the remainder under the
table. From a study on such fee evasion practices in Yunnan, we know that
lawyers go through considerable trouble to ensure that these practices go
undetected. 94 Key here is that they develop sufficient trust from their clients.
Without trust, clients can always turn to the firm or the authorities to report the
lawyer, as clients will be able to compare what they paid with the amount on the
actual receipt they received from the firm. As such, lawyers can only engage in
such fee offenses if they know their clients well and have a longer working
relationship.9 5 They convince clients to pay in this manner by giving a discount
paid directly from the firm commission and taxes the lawyer avoids paying.
When lawyers report part of the income to the firm, they can benefit from having
a formal legal representation contract, and thus represent their clients in court as
their attorney. Lawyers who do not report their clients at all have to be more
creative when doing trial work. In civil cases, lawyers can act as so-called civil
representatives, where they do not act as part of the legal profession but just as
informed citizens. 96 Lawyers in the Yunnan study have even been able to
represent their clients in criminal cases. Some do so through close social
connections with the court, the procuratorate, and the police, while others resort
to fabricating the legal representation agreements by "borrowing" the official
firm stamps.97
Attorney Li Zhonglian, mentioned in the opening paragraph of the Introduc-
tion, is the most egregious fee offender in the Zhejiang database. He twice was
caught for not sharing fees: charging the client RMB 1 million (ca. $154,000) but
"only hand[ing] over" RMB 300,000 ($46,000) in 2011; and charging RMB 5.2
million (ca. $800,000) but only giving RMB 700,000 ($108,000) to his law firm.
He eventually handed over the remaining amount to his law firm in 2015 and
suffered a six-month license suspension.98
The fee violation cases also reflect a wide range of discipline, ranging from
warnings to suspended licenses for three to ten months. The harshest sanction
among the fee cases went to attorney Zhu Wenbing, who not only charged clients
without permission of his law firm, but also set up his own office without
registering. He was suspended for ten months, and "unlawful income" of RMB
94. See van Rooij, Weak Enforcement, Strong Deterrence, supra note 5, at 289.
95. Id. at 296-97.
96. Id. at 298.
97. Id. at 297-98.
98. Supra note 3. The case of Li Zhonglian also hints at another issue in this database: periods of delay
between the wrongdoing and the final punishment. The fee violations occurred in 2011 and 2012, but the
sanction was not issued until 2015. Perhaps there had been a delay in the discovery of the wrongdoing, but of
the fee cases that were the basis of discipline, most involved at least a two-year gap between the offense and the
disciplinary sanction. Professor Stephen Gillers' recent detailed analysis of the New York attorney disciplinary
system flagged a common and "unconscionably long" delay in New York between the transgression and the
sanction, or the filing of charges and the sanction. Stephen Gillers, Lowering the Bar: How Lawyer Discipline in
New York Fails to Protect the Public, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 485, 496 (2014).
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3000 ($150) was confiscated. Given the relatively small amount of money
involved, just a fraction of the millions retained by attorney Li above, it is
noteworthy that the harshest sanction was reserved for the lawyer who ventured
to become independent. Reinforcing this point, individual law firms, which
resemble solo practices in the United States, were only permitted in China after
the 2007 Lawyers Law revision, and a lawyer must have at least five years of
practice experience to set up such a law firm.99
It is difficult to discern a basis for the length of suspensions. A handful of cases
list the amount of money either confiscated or the amount the attorney was fined,
including 00 :
* Lawyer Li Zhonglian-4.5 million yuan ($624,000) not turned over,
six-month suspension;
* Lawyer Guo Xingzhou-2500 ($365) confiscated, three-month
suspension;
* Lawyer Wu Wei-2500 ($365) confiscated, nine-month suspension;
* Lawyer Ji Qiu-2000 ($290) confiscated, three-month suspension;
* Lawyer Zhou Guanhong-10,000 ($1450) fined, six-month suspension;
* Lawyer Wang Guangya-50,000 ($7300) confiscated, 3000 fined and a
warning;
* Lawyer Ye Shiwu-50,000 ($7300) fined, three-month suspension;
* Lawyer Li Mingjun-2000 ($290) fine and a warning.
Scholars of the Chinese legal profession suggest that the wide range of state
sanctions may reflect the level of political embeddedness of the lawyers involved
or the symbiotic exchange between lawyers and state officials."o0 We do not have
direct evidence to show that such practice also exists in lawyer discipline, but
given the prevalence of Chinese lawyers' political ties at the local level, it is
plausible that disciplinary sanctions are also influenced by the personal relations
between lawyers and BOJ officials.
To what extent does the prevalence of discipline for fee violations reflect an
interest in client protection? None of the fee violation cases mention overcharg-
ing or excessive fees. We also do not see indications in these cases that the fee
violations coincided with incompetence, conflicts of interest, or other ways in
99. Lawyers Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective June
1, 2008) art. 16, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471604.htm [https://perma.cc/
38J7-4C59] (unofficial translation).
100. Supra note 10. We have provided approximate (rounded) currency value in U.S. dollars to give readers a
flavor of the amount. Exchange rates will vary.
101. See, e.g., Michelson, Political Embeddedness, supra note 16 (examining the role of politics in the legal
practice of Chinese criminal defense lawyers); Liu & Halliday, Political Liberalism, supra note 6 (analyzing the
concept of political embeddedness as it applies to Chinese lawyers); Liu, Lawyers, State Officials, and
Significant Others, supra note 4 (analyzing the process of symbiotic exchange between lawyers and state
officials in China).
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which the lawyers' services negatively affected their clients. This is striking, as it
is very likely that in many of these cases the clients reported the fee violations to
the firm or the authorities, as it is nearly impossible for firms or authorities to
unearth fee violations without a client's help. 10 2 If client interests had been
remotely at stake here, we would have at least in some cases learned about how
the lawyer's conduct had hurt the client's interests. Yet we found no such
indications.
Instead of clients' interests, fee discipline serves the interests of the law firm
and of the BOJ. By taking money under the table, most1 0 3 lawyers fail to pay the
commission due to their firm, which can rise to up to fifty percent, at least in
Yunnan province where we have more detail about these practices.1 04 Given this
financial arrangement, law firms have considerable interest in maintaining fee
compliance. Firm managers, especially of the most successful firms, can assert
influence in their local lawyers' associations, which play a role in the regulation
of lawyers and work closely with the BOJ. The firm interest in compliance with
fee regulation coincides perfectly with the party-state's interest in controlling
lawyers. Lawyers who go rogue and charge outside the firm structure are less
embedded in a law firm structure, and thus less susceptible to monitoring. With
the BOJ's political interest in keeping lawyers tightly aligned with firms, and the
firm's financial interest, both have an interest in lawyers being disciplined for fee
violations. Add loss of local tax revenue to this, and we have a good explanation
of why fee cases are so prevalent, even though they do not seem to serve any
direct client interest. Indeed, a client may even benefit from having the lawyer
charge outside the law firm if the lawyer shares the savings with the client, but
that is not sufficient to overcome the firm and state interest in keeping the lawyer
bound tightly to the law firm.
2. CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
The second most common basis of discipline was a criminal conviction, with
twenty-eight cases in which a lawyer's license was revoked on that basis, as
required by article 49 of the Lawyers Law. The underlying criminal offenses
broke down as follows:
102. van Rooij, Weak Enforcement, Strong Deterrence, supra note 5, at 294.
103. Some lawyers work on the basis of a salaried contract and should actually not receive any money from
clients. Others work on a commission basis, paying up to fifty percent. However, some lawyers work on a
so-called chengbao contract through which they must pay a fixed fee to the firm and are allowed to keep all
client fees themselves.
104. See van Rooij, Weak Enforcement, Strong Deterrence, supra note 5, at 293.
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FIGURE III: Types of Criminal Convictions
Regulatory Goal of a Permanent Exclusion. Having a permanent exclusion
from being a lawyer for anyone convicted of a crime (except for the crime of
negligence) can be seen as promoting a regulatory goal of respect for law and
upholding the reputation of the legal profession. This puts tremendous power into
the hands of prosecutors. In the United States we would call it "collateral
consequences," such as non-U.S. citizens facing deportation for conviction of
certain crimes.1 0 5 Certainly a great many countries have almost automatic
discipline for convictions of a crime, including the United States. Allowing for
the possibility of reinstatement reflects a belief in the possibility of rehabilita-
tion-or at least an indication that there is social value to this goal. With a quickly
growing Chinese legal profession, this permanent bar may reflect a desire for
clear and sharp lines that will send a signal to lawyers to promote a respect for
law.
Criminal Convictions for Dangerous Driving. The most common criminal
conviction was for "dangerous driving" (weixian jiashi zui), a crime similar to
DUI in the United States, which was added to the PRC Criminal Law in 2011.106
With the rapid growth of automobiles in China, car accidents and drunk driving
105. See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences at Guilty
Plea, 54 How. L.J. 675, 675-76 (2011).
106. PRC Criminal Law (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong. Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997),
art. 133, translated in Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (AsianLIl).
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have been flagged as a significant social issue. 107 A Bloomberg Philanthropies
road safety report indicates that China had 220,000 road deaths in 2010-2012, the
highest of the ten countries examined.os According to a 2012 study in two major
cities, about twenty percent of traffic deaths involved drunk drivers.109 China
amended its Road Traffic Safety Law in 2011 to impose stronger punishment for
drunk driving violations.1 "Authorities launched a nationwide enforcement
campaign. In Beijing alone, authorities assigned 7,000 officers at 1,400
checkpoints to catch drunk drivers."' Given the prevalence of drunk drivers and
the increased crackdowns, it is no surprise that lawyers, who are likely to drive a
car as well as engage in alcohol consumption as part of their business and social
activities,1 1 2 have been caught for this violation.
The question for us is what regulatory interest is served here. These lawyers
have been criminally convicted, and that status alone results in permanent loss of
their practice certificates. But there may be other interests as well. A province
may wish to send strong signals against drunk driving in general. Or in an effort
to change legal culture, the province may want to protect the reputation of the
legal profession and the legal system as a whole. Of course, here it means that
discipline may be imposed for conduct not related to the practice of law. This
concept is well understood among U.S. lawyers, though not necessarily
applauded. U.S. lawyers who fail to file tax returns, drive drunk, or chronically
fail to pay for parking tickets may find themselves before the bar's disciplinary
apparatus. 1 13
Criminal Convictions for Obstructing Witnesses and Fabricating Evidence.
There were six disbarments for criminal convictions for obstructing witnesses
and another four for fabricating and/or destroying evidence. Along with these
criminal convictions, there were five cases in which lawyers received a civil
disciplinary sanction for forgery, with the precise misconduct being some form of
fabricating evidence. As with bribery below, there appears to be prosecutorial
discretion on whether to proceed with criminal sanctions or to allow the
disciplinary process to address the issue.
107. See Laney Zhang, China: Harsher Punishments for Driving after Drinking, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR
(Law Library of Cong.) (May 10, 2011), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-harsher-punishments-
for-driving-after-drinking [perma.cc/74JN-8V4W].
108. BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES, LEADING THE WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE ROAD SAFETY
(2010-2012),http://www.mikebloomberg.com/content/uploads/sites/10/2015/06/BloombergPhilanthropiesL
eading the Worldwide MovementtoImproveRoadSafety.pdf [http://perma.cc/HE96-Y56U].
109. Ying Li et al., The Drink Driving Situation in China, 13 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 101, 106 (2012).
110. Zhang, supra note 107.
111. T.P., Intoxication in China: Two New Crackdowns. One Is Working, ECONOMIST (May 20, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/05/intoxicationchina [http://perma.cc/TM9Q-3VDS].
112. See Mary Szto, Contract in My Soup: Chinese Contract Formation and Ritual Eating and Drunkenness,
25 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
113. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 57, § 3.3.4, at 97-98 (discussing discipline for lawyers in
nonlawyer role).
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Two cases offer examples of the conduct that led the lawyers into trouble. He
Huiqiang was representing Chen Haidong in a divorce. According to a news
report, He Huiqiang proposed a complex process of mixing debts and bringing a
false lawsuit to create false creditors, resulting in the appearance of large joint
debts in the marriage. The wife complained, the divorce was suspended, and He
Huiqiang, Chen Haidong and his father were found to have committed the crime
of conspiring to forge evidence.1 1 4 Here, the criminal prosecution as well as the
disciplinary sanctions served to protect the public interest of upholding the rule of
law and the reputation of the legal profession. One could also find a form of client
protection here, as disbarring lawyers who so brazenly flaunt the law protects
future clients from the same fate as Chen Haidong, the client in this unfortunate
affair.
Feng Weimin was representing Chen Duqing for alleged rape. According to the
written opinion, Feng Weimin asked the victim's family to withdraw their
testimony and "dictated to the testimony's points and gave them a written,
redesigned testimony, which caused the victim to contradict the prosecutor's
evidence." 1 5 Feng Weimin was criminally convicted of falsifying evidence by
forging evidence, was sentenced to eight months in prison, and had his license
revoked. This might have been a case of a false accusation, which the defense
attorney uncovered. Or it might have been a private payment or some other
coercion to encourage the victim to change the original testimony. If the former,
we might see this conduct as zealously representing the client to uncover the
truth. If the latter, we might see this as improper, undermining the functioning of
the legal system and thus the regulatory goal of protecting the rule of law as well
as the reputation of the legal profession.
Criminal charges for fabricating evidence have a complicated dynamic in
China. Article 42 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and article 306 of the PRC
Criminal Law establish the crime of lawyer's perjury:
Defense lawyers . . . shall not help criminal suspects or defendants conceal,
destroy, or fabricate evidence, or collude with a criminal suspect or defendant
to make confessions consistent, and must not intimidate or induce witnesses to
give false testimony or take any other acts to interfere with the proceedings of
judicial organs.1 16
Often labeled "Big Stick 306" among Chinese lawyers, this crime presents what
is sometimes referred to as a "Sword of Damocles" hanging over Chinese legal
114. See 4f'-gji iff1E #JfJ [Hangzhou-a lawyer was sentenced for interfering with
evidence], NEWS ON THE PEOPLE'S CouR (2010) (China), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-06/04/c_12181
257.htm [http://perma.cc/N3HY-9EK8].
115. Zhejiang Province Office of Justice, Written Decision of Administrative Punishment, Zhejiang Penalty
Summary #3 (2007) (translated opinion on file with authors).
116. PRC Criminal Procedure Law [P.R.C. Laws] (promulgated by The National People's Congress Mar. 14,
2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013) art. 42; PRC Criminal Law [P.R.C. Laws], art. 306.
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practitioners when they consider whether to investigate in criminal cases.1 1 7 If
they fail to investigate, they are not fulfilling their duty. If their investigation
yields evidence that contradicts the prosecution's evidence, which might have
happened in attorney Feng Weimin's case, they may find themselves accused of
violating article 306. This ethical dilemma has led to the detention, arrest, or
criminal conviction of hundreds of Chinese lawyers since article 306 was written
into the Criminal Law in 1997, including the nationally renowned Li Zhuang case
in 2009-2011."" In some cases, local police and procurators even deliberately
use this crime as revenge against defense attorneys who dare to challenge the
evidence in their dossier.1 19 Although the number of criminal convictions in the
Zhejiang data seems small, many article 306 detentions or charges would not
result in disciplinary sanctions if withdrawn by the prosecution or resolved as not
guilty verdicts.
In sum, we can thus conclude that there can be mixed regulatory goals for
criminal convictions. In cases where there is actual obstruction of witnesses or
fabrication of evidence, lawyer discipline serves to uphold the reputation of the
profession and the rule of law, and to protect future clients from illegal practices.
However, there are also cases where article 306 prosecutions are used without a
proper basis against activist criminal defenders as a means to protect the interests
of the party-state and quell lawyers from doing a proper job in defending their
clients and providing due process.
3. BRIBERY
Bribery was also an issue among the Zhejiang lawyers in our sample. Ten
lawyers received disciplinary sanctions for offering bribes. Nine of the ten case
summaries expressly stated that the lawyers had bribed a judge. Four of the
lawyers had their licenses permanently revoked because of a criminal conviction
for bribery.
The Chinese party-state has waged multiple battles with corruption. 12 0 Since
Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he has continued and expanded these efforts
through a massive anti-corruption campaign, targeting both higher-level officials
("tigers") and lowly bureaucrats ("flies"), and using severe punishment and
measures to decrease opportunities, such as restricting banquets. 121 As a matter of
117. See Liu & HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA, supra note 6.
118. See generally Sida Liu, Lily Liang & Terence C. Halliday, The Trial of Li Zhuang: Chinese Lawyers'
Collective Action against Populism, 1 ASIAN J.L. & SocY 79 (2014).
119. Liu & HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA, supra note 6.
120. See generally Benjamin van Rooij, China's War on Graft: Politico-Legal Campaigns Against
Corruption in China and Their Similarities to the Legal Reactions to Crisis in the U.S., 14 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y
J. 289 (2005).
121. Fu Hualing, Wielding the Sword: President Xi's New Anti-Corruption Campaign, at 136 (Nov. 29,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractuid=2492407 [https://perma.cc/N52Q-8SXC].
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law1 2 2 and also enforcement practice, the priority has been to crack down hardest
on officials taking bribes, with lesser punishment for those offering bribes.
The opening paragraph of this Article provides an example of a criminal
conviction of a judge that swept up eleven attorneys in its wake. Four of the five
attorneys were dealt with through the lawyer disciplinary process and one
attorney was criminally convicted, jailed, and stripped of his license. There is no
evidence of public discipline for the other six lawyers involved. Set out below in
Figure IV is an overview of the wrongdoing and disciplinary sanctions from the
court's opinion in the criminal conviction of Judge Wang Jianhong. 1 2 3 There is
some lack of clarity in the court's description, but this chart sets out our best
interpretation of the actors and the court's findings:
FIGURE IV:
Attorney Misconduct Described in Court Opinion Upholding the Criminal
Conviction of Judge Wang Jianhong
Name Description of Bribe Discipline
Guo Rui For purposes of giving his case to a License suspended for
judge of his own choosing, treated nine months.
Wang to dinner and gave him 1000
yuan.
Mou Xiujun Allegation of the prosecutor was that License suspended for
out of appreciation for Wang's help three months for
on a case and hope for continued bribery.
support treated Wang to a meal and
gave him 10,000 yuan. The court
opinion rejects this allegation,
finding that Wang Jianhong did not
accept bribes of 10,000 yuan.
Li Hongfei During the Spring Festival from 2006 License suspended for
to 2007, out of appreciation for nine months.
Wang's assistance, at the entrance
of Taizhou City Intermediate
People's Court, gave Wang 1000
yuan and two shopping cards worth
1500 yuan. Opinion also notes that
Li Hongfei and Wang were good
friends but rejects a claim that these
were just gifts from a friend.
122. PRC Criminal Law (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong. Mar. 14, 1997), translated in 2010 P.R.C.
Laws 383, 385, 386, 389, 390. PRC Criminal Code articles 383, 385, and 386 show that the maximum penalty
for accepting bribes is the death penalty, whereas according to articles 389 and 390, the maximum penalty for
offering bribes is life imprisonment. For each of the categories of seriousness, the acceptance of bribes sanction
is higher than that for offering bribes.
123. See generally Zhejiang Taizhou City People's Court Criminal Decisions (2008), Case No. 215 of the
Public Prosecution of Jiojiang District (translation on file with authors).
294 [Vol. 30:267
LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
Name Description of Bribe Discipline
Chen Linhui Over three occasions, gave 1000 yuan, Licensed suspended for
a DVD, and a 1000 yuan gift card. nine months; fined
10,000 yuan.
Xu Yucong From 2004-2006, on four separate Charged with crime of
occasions paid a total of 14,000 bribery, sentenced to
yuan for assistance on a case. two-and-a-half years
in jail, license
revoked.
Maochu Ming Gave 15,000 yuan in appreciation for No evidence of
help on a case. discipline by ZPBOJ.
Mou Nengjie (legal Twice went to Wang's home and gave No evidence of
counsel for corp) him a total of 15,000 yuan. discipline by ZPBOJ.
Mei Qiliang Loaned 2000 yuan, in appreciation for No evidence of
help; another lawyer told the judge discipline by ZPBOJ.
not to repay it.
Zheng Xinli Gave twelve restaurant gift cards No evidence of
totaling 12,000 yuan through a third discipline by ZPBOJ.
party (Wang Jinshu).
Zhu Caijuan Gave ten restaurant gift cards through No evidence of
a third party (Yao Wang). discipline by ZPBOJ.
Wang Xiaofang Gave four restaurant gift cards totaling No evidence of
16,000 yuan and a packet with 4000 discipline by ZPBOJ.
yuan through a third party (Wang
Jinshu).
The lawyers for whom there is no evidence of public discipline provided
money and gifts ranging from 2000 to 16,000 yuan, mostly on the higher end.
The bribery discipline cases send contradictory signals. On the one hand we
see that even within the strong anti-corruption campaign, the disciplinary
punishment for those caught bribing is not overly severe. Many are allowed to
continue to practice, some even without any disciplinary response. We see a large
variation in punishment, where there is no clear link between the seriousness of
the bribery and the discipline meted out. Minor bribes result in nine-month
suspensions, while major bribes receive light or no discipline at all.
Disciplining lawyers for paying bribes obviously serves the interest of the rule
of law, especially in cases where the bribed official was a judge. Discipline in
these cases may also help to uphold the image of the legal profession by
discouraging such practices. On the other hand, when there are too many cases,
disciplinary action may actually signal a deep defect in the profession. There can
also be an implicit client protection goal by weeding out, or at least punishing,
lawyers who lead their clients into bribery practices.
The inconsistent punishment here also shows the breadth of discretion by
disciplinary authorities. As with discretion in most legal systems, it is difficult to
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ascertain what factors the authorities consider beyond the seriousness of the
bribery at hand. Whether such interests serve the party-state or may be of a more
personal and maybe even collusive or corrupt nature is not clear from the data we
have here.
4. FAMILY PLANNING VIOLATIONS
Within our sample, there was one case in which discipline involved a very
particular state interest: population control. In 2008, lawyer Rongbu Wu's license
was suspended for three months for exceeding the stipulated limit of the
birth-control policy. The specific act was "had a boy after already having a girl."
The regulatory authorities here disciplined a lawyer for violating China's strict
population control policy as it still applied in 2008.24 In this case regulatory
authorities may have sought to uphold the rule of law or the reputation of lawyers
by punishing a lawyer for breaking the law. It seems just as likely, however, that
in meting out this disciplinary sanction the regulatory authorities were using
whatever regulatory vehicle available to aid the party-state in implementing its
population policy.
5. VIOLATIONS IMPLICATING CLIENT INTERESTS
In the violations discussed so far, client protection only featured at best as an
implicit and secondary objective, where punishing a lawyer for breaking the law
might also protect future clients of such lawyers from being led into criminal
activities. In our sample though, there were a handful of cases that more clearly
concerned client protection.
Four cases (three percent of the disciplinary cases) involved failure "to
perform duty as legal counsel," which we interpret as a form of neglect. The case
summaries are silent as to the specific failures, but they do set out the sanctions.
One lawyer received a warning. Two other lawyers were warned and fined RMB
5000 yuan ($770) and 8000 yuan ($1230), respectively. One lawyer, disciplined
for "failure to perform his duty as legal counsel without justification," was
suspended for five months. Given the frequent suspension for receiving fees
without permission of the law firm, it is striking how neglect received more
lenient treatment. We of course do not know the details of the particular cases and
whether the clients were harmed.
Another seven cases involved other forms of misconduct that we cluster as
client protection. One lawyer was suspended for three-and-a-half months for
disclosing client privacy. A second lawyer was suspended for three months for
misappropriating client property. A third lawyer received a warning for violating
124. See generally Wang Feng, Baochang Gu & Yong Cai, The End of China's One-Child Policy, 47 STUD.
FAM. PLANNING 83-86 (2016).
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the conflicts of interest regulation. A fourth lawyer received a warning and fine of
RMB 1100 yuan for taking money/things of value from the client while providing
legal aid work. Another three lawyers were involved in some form of faking the
signature of the client on a letter of authorization, resulting in one warning and
two suspensions for six months.
Clustering these matters together, it appears that up to eleven of the 122 cases
involve some aspect of client protection. As noted above, the neglect sanctions
are light; misappropriating client property receives a three-month suspension; a
lawyer who engages in a conflict is warned. Both the numbers and the penalties
suggest that although client protection is part of the Lawyers Law and the Code of
Conduct, it is not a disciplinary priority, either in terms of disciplinary cases
brought or in terms of the seriousness of the sanctions.
CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
China's authoritarian regime delicately balances the "leaders' desire to
capitalize on the advantages of a competent legal system while simultaneously
maintaining political control."1 2 5 A competent legal system requires competent
actors, so it is important to have competence as a regulatory goal in the lawyer
discipline system. The Zhejiang data indicates, however, that the goal of political
control runs so deep within China that it dominates even the regional lawyer
disciplinary system, the place where we might expect other goals to also be
reflected.
We are not surprised to find political control in this data. The China experience
reminds us that being a lawyer does not inherently carry certain obligations.
Instead, lawyers are given roles within the particular legal regime. Lawyers in the
United States often see themselves as agents of change. 126 China does not
embrace that model. Other commentators have argued that the application of the
Lawyers Law over the last five years has had the intent to "eradicate cause
lawyering." 1 2 7 While the persecution of human rights lawyers in China has been
well documented by both overseas scholars and the international media, 128 the
dominance of fee discipline in the Zhejiang data reveals a more nuanced method
of control: tightly tying lawyers to firms that can serve as institutions to control
wayward lawyers. This and other forms of administrative control on lawyers
deserve more attention in future research on the Chinese legal profession.
125. Stern, supra note 69, at 3.
126. See, e.g., James Moliterno, The Lawyer as Catalyst of Social Change, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 1559, 1560
(2009).
127. Elizabeth M. Lynch, The Anatomy of a Crackdown: China's Assault on its Human Rights Lawyers,
CHINA L. & PoL'Y (Oct. 18, 2015), http://chinalawandpolicy.com/tag/lawyers-law [https://perma.cclDF2Q-
VPJQ].
128. Fu & Cullen, supra note 4; Pius, supra note 6; Liu & HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA, supra
note 6.
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What is less obvious is the current absence of evidence, based on our limited
data, of a governmental goal of regulating lawyers to improve competence and
prevent professional failures, especially given the ACLA's public statement that
this conduct is a source of concern. Even bribery concerns, the topic of an
ongoing government campaign, runs second to the goal of keeping lawyers
tightly tied to firms and justice bureaus. There is nothing in the political control of
lawyers that would prevent a regulatory goal of improving the quality of the legal
profession as a whole, yet the dominance of a political logic to lawyer discipline
has made professional competence and other ethical issues only secondarily
important in lawyer discipline.
The most benign explanation is that we do not know whether complaints about
attorneys make their way to the relevant disciplinary body. Perhaps such issues
are harder to assess, or perhaps the disciplinary apparatus has a pro-lawyer bent
when addressing client issues. 129
The subordination of a client-protection goal in lawyer discipline may be
attributable to the emerging understanding of the role of clients within the
Chinese legal system. Benjamin Liebman's study of legal aid in China noted a
similar lack of attention to the needs of clients in the development of legal aid and
the legal profession. 13 0 Where local governments have taken steps to protect
clients in legal aid practice, the regulations "suggest a paternalistic attitude
toward clients" where "Chinese clients are almost always portrayed as passive
recipients of lawyer and/or government services." 1 3 1 Similar to the findings in
our study, he found that client interests were secondary to both the state's
development of institutions and lawyers' financial interests. 13 2 Failing to focus
more on clients creates risk for Chinese clients because lawyers depend on a
complicated web of relationships to maneuver in the legal system and Chinese
lawyers "are as willing as their counterparts elsewhere to sacrifice client interests
as they strive to maintain such relationships."1 3 3
As a practical matter, clients in China do not have other viable legal outlets to
hold lawyers accountable for failure to perform their legal duties competently. In
the process of research for this Article, we found no records of lawyers in China
being sued by their clients for malpractice, suggesting that tort lawsuits are not
129. The question of leniency by disciplinary systems and courts has been raised by U.S. commentators.
Gillers, supra note 98, at 490 (finds that the New York disciplinary system "fails the professed purpose of
protecting the public and the administration of justice"); cf. Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically
Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453 (2008).
130. Benjamin L. Liebman, Lawyers, Legal Aid, and Legitimacy in China, in RAISING THE BAR: THE
EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA 344 (William P. Alford ed., 2007).
131. Id. at 345.
132. Id. ("Client interests appear secondary in a system in which the state is focusing on developing
institutions and on raising the number of lawyers, and in which lawyers themselves appear caught up in
exploring new opportunities, primarily financial.").
133. Id.
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currently a strong method of regulation. Given the limited alternatives, the
disciplinary system made and enforced by the justice bureaus arguably becomes
an even more important potential mechanism of client protection. 134
The lack of attention to client interests reflects regulatory triage. Many
observers see China as a comparatively robust economy with a particularly
fragile political system. It is evident from our data analysis that the regulatory
apparatus puts competence and client protection far below the political goals of
shoring up the infrastructure of control. This tracks the other forms of political
control of lawyers, such as arrests and detentions that have occurred over the
last few years. 13 5 The tight political control of the legal profession is a
sensitive indicator of both the strength and the potential fragility of the
Chinese party-state.
On a more optimistic note, perhaps other systems in China can be used to
implement the goal of improving the competence of the legal profession. We can
identify two possibilities. First, just as the American Bar Association and state
bars engage in exhortation and social pressure to be better, stronger, faster,
perhaps the ACLA can play that same role in China even with its limited
autonomy from the party-state. A second possibility is to focus more sharply on
law firms as the situs for improving competence. Indeed, the Chinese experience
of building a strong system of law firm regulation is consistent with many
American scholars' recommendations that we move to firm-based regulation. 13 6
Perhaps law firm discipline can be a source of private and indirect regulation
to improve competence. Given that the majority of Chinese law firms provide
only minimal administrative support for their lawyers, there are practical
challenges to imposing this obligation on law firms. The efficacy of their
indirect regulation beyond political control is another question that needs
further research.
The dominance of party-state interests over client protection reflects not only
the socialist legacy, but also the persistence of an authoritarian legality in
contemporary China. While arrests, detentions, show trials, and criminal
convictions are a well-known method of control, 1 37 this Zhejiang data demon-
strates the power of the disciplinary system and law firms to serve as a strong
134. We are conscious of the danger of exporting the American understanding of law to China. See, e.g.,
JEDIDIAH J. KRONCKE, THE FUTILTY OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: CHINA AND THE DANGERS OF EXPORTING
AMERICAN LAw (2016).
135. See Lynch, Rule of Law Mirage, supra note 5; Liu & HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA, supra
note 6.
136. See supra note 83.
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situs of control. The endurance of this authoritarian legality in China is also a
warning to democratic legal systems to identify and stay faithful to regulatory
goals that promote an independent and competent legal profession. 138
138. The American Bar Association recently adopted regulatory objectives for the legal profession:
A. Protection of the public
B. Advancement of the administration of justice and the rule of law
C. Meaningful access to justice and information about the law, legal issues, and the civil and criminal
justice systems
D. Transparency regarding the nature and scope of legal services to be provided, the credentials of
those who provide them, and the availability of regulatory protections
E. Delivery of affordable and accessible legal services
F. Efficient, competent, and ethical delivery of legal services
G. Protection of privileged and confidential information
H. Independence of professional judgment
I. Accessible civil remedies for negligence and breach of other duties owed, and disciplinary
sanctions for misconduct
J. Diversity and inclusion among legal services providers and freedom from discrimination for those
receiving legal services and in the justice system.
AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA MODEL REGULATORY OBJECTIVES FOR THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES (2016), http://
www.americanbar.org/contenUdam/aba/images/office-president/final-regulatory-obj ectives-resolution_
november_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q64K-RC3K].
